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Abstract
Historians have long taken an interest in military recruitment advertising and public relations. Much of their attention, however, has been directed towards promotion in wartime, with a lot less known about how governments used media to attract civilians in peacetime or during the many so-called ‘limited wars’ of the post-war era. This paper addresses this shortcoming by exploring three separate recruitment campaigns waged in Britain at different moments in the twentieth century. Giving a sense of the scale of official recruiting work, it highlights the central role played by commercial advertising and public relations professionals in the planning and development of campaigns and investigates whether recruiters were actually successful in convincing civilians to join up. The evidence presented here suggests that they had a negligible effect on enrolment rates. Yet, it also indicates that different types of appeal were used to attract civilians in peacetime, with material rewards typically taking precedence over notions of patriotic duty. Suggesting that such appeals effectively commodified military service, this paper concludes by reflecting on their broader legacy to studies of media, war and conflict.
The First World War has rightly been heralded as a defining moment in the history of military recruitment advertising and public relations in Britain (Taylor, 2003: 193; Welch, 2013: 81). The decision to raise a series of New Armies to give the UK numerical parity with the forces of the Central Powers led to the creation of a Parliamentary Recruiting Committee and possibly the largest recruitment campaign ever witnessed on British soil (Winter, 1998: 216). Posters, leaflets and flyers were disseminated on an unprecedented scale, and the sheer quantity of official promotion may explain why this Committee has featured in social histories of the wartime home front (Marwick, 1978: 51; Gullace, 2002: ch. 2), case study analyses of military recruitment (Douglas, 1970; Dutton, 1989; Hiley, 1997; Maartens, 2016a), and general accounts and overviews of government propaganda (Haste, 1977: ch. 4; Sanders and Taylor, 1983: 15-18; Messenger, 1992: 208; Green, 2014: 313). 
The Great War is itself routinely identified with the beginning of modern government propaganda (Haste, 1977: 1; Messenger, 1992: 2; Taylor, 1999: 5 & 2003: 176; Welch, 2013: 15), but it was neither the first nor the last occasion when large-scale military recruitment campaigns were organised in Britain. At the height of the Second Boer War, a handful of domestic patriotic organisations used newspaper articles, religious sermons and public meetings to encourage ‘citizen-soldiers’ to join up (Hampton, 2001; Miller, 2005; Beaven, 2009). In 1938-9, another major recruiting drive was organised, this time for civil defence and auxiliary and reserve forces (Maartens, 2015), while several smaller campaigns were also waged in the post-war era despite the continuation of conscription or ‘National Service’ until 1960.​[1]​
Bringing together politicians, civil servants and experts in the advertising and public relations industries, these campaigns represented important sites of convergence of political and commercial communication. Though the texts associated with them – posters, films, newsreels, radio and television broadcasts and so on – are usually described as a form of government propaganda, they were often produced by private individuals whose perceived expertise at making and shaping media content gave them a privileged role within the state’s communications apparatus. This role has been explored in several accounts of wartime propaganda which directly or indirectly address matters of recruitment (Reeves, 1983; Hiley, 1985, 1987, 1997; Dutton; 1989; Baker, 1990; Messenger, 1992; Paris, 1999). Yet, it remains largely unexplored in studies of peacetime mobilisation. Very little, in fact, is known about recruitment in times of peace, how it differed from wartime practices, if it differed at all, and whether recruiters managed to convince civilians to join up.
This paper provides some tentative answers to these questions by analysing three separate recruitment campaigns waged at different moments in the twentieth century. The only study of its kind to be published, it highlights the central role played by commercial advertising and public relations professionals in the planning and development of campaigns and draws attention to the continuities and changes that lay at the heart of their work. The first case it considers, an Army recruiting drive organised on the eve of the Great War, set a precedent not just for the large-scale mobilisations of that conflict, but for all inter-war and post-war campaigns as well. The second, launched in the run up to the Korean War, entailed coordinated mobilisations for all three Services at the same time, in what became an early undertaking of the newly-formed Ministry of Defence (MOD). The final campaign, a 1960s recruiting drive for the Royal Air Force (RAF), was one of several organised during this period that involved empirical research into recruiters’ target audiences, research that both informed promotional work and demonstrated its limitations.
Taken together, these campaigns give a sense of the scale of official recruiting work during an important period in British military history. They also show that recruiters seemed to have a negligible effect on enrolment rates, at least when comparing figures before, during and after campaigns, and that they tended to appeal to material rather than patriotic rewards in their peacetime promotion. Reflecting on why that might be, this paper concludes with a wide-ranging discussion of the legacy of military recruitment campaigns to studies of media, war and conflict.
‘What the Army Offers’: Selling Service in the Army, 1913-14
Though Britain emerged victorious from the war in South Africa, the poor performance of its troops and their inability to swiftly overcome a supposedly inferior enemy led to a series of post-war enquiries into the effectiveness of official recruiting machinery.​[2]​ In 1904, the Secretary of State for War Hugh Arnold-Forster circulated a memorandum to the Cabinet warning of the ‘evils’ of the present recruiting regime. Proposing a series of reforms which he believed would improve the capacity of the Army to attract the brightest and healthiest recruits, Arnold-Foster called for the creation of a number of new recruiting depots that would be ‘well built, well lighted, and attractive’, the replacement of ineffective recruiting sergeants with ‘officers and men specifically selected for their ability to instruct and inspire young men’, and the provision of a wide range of sporting and leisure facilities to attract new recruits while ensuring existing soldiers remained fit and healthy (Balfour Papers, 1904).
Material inducements would represent the cornerstone of the 1913-14 campaign. Yet, the clamour to reform how the Army raised its troops had more immediate consequences in the shape of the Haldane Reforms of 1906-7 and creation of the Territorial Force, antecedent to the Territorial Army, in 1908. The latter body, formed to provide a volunteer reserve force that would ‘both support and expand the army’ by freeing regulars from domestic service and preparing reservists for future foreign service (Holmes, 2005: 130), had some early success in attracting volunteers (Simkins, 2007: 16). By 1910, however, its capacity and that of the Regular Army to attract and retain new recruits was again being called into question. 
At this point, and in contrast to many of its continental neighbours, Britain relied entirely on voluntary means of recruitment, an arrangement that prompted the retired Field Marshal Lord Frederick Roberts to warn parliament that ‘our military system is hopelessly inadequate; we have neither a Home Army such as is needed for the defence of this country, nor an effective Regular Army to protect our Imperial interests abroad’ (Hansard, 3 April 1911: 821). By 1913, wastage, the rate at which men left the military, ran at 12.4% per annum in the Territorials and 6% in the Regular Army, with both forces seriously under-manned as a result (Holmes, 2005: 130; Beckett, Bowman and Connelly, 2017: 11-12, 32). To resolve this problem, some observers, including Roberts and the National Service League he had co-founded (Adams, 1985: 61-2), called for some form of compulsory military training. Colonel John Seely, the new Secretary of State for War, opted for a different tactic: a major voluntary recruitment drive that utilised commercial techniques of persuasion. 
The origins of this drive have been recounted in an important but often overlooked study by Nicholas Hiley (1987: 31), who suggests that a chance meeting on a Surrey golf course between Seely, Sir George Riddell, managing director of The News of the World, and Hedley (later Sir) Le Bas, owner of a major publishing firm, marked the beginning of modern government propaganda in Britain. Hiley’s main focus is Le Bas’s role in Britain’s wartime propaganda machinery, and he devotes only two pages to the pre-war campaign. The circumstances surrounding this campaign were also recounted by Le Bas himself, who claimed in a book published in 1916 that Seely approached him to ‘find 35,000 men’ (1916: unnumbered), and by his assistant Eric Field (1959) who gave a similar account in his autobiography. 
As Peter Buitenhuis (1989: 12) has noted, it was not uncommon for matters of state to be settled at golf clubs in the Asquith era. Precisely that appears to have happened when Seely first met Le Bas on the Walton Heath course in March 1913. Introduced to one another by Riddell, Seely agreed to hire Le Bas’s firm, the Caxtons Publishing Company, after Le Bas presented what Hiley (1989: 33) has called a ‘detailed publicity scheme’ to the War Office. This scheme would target both regulars and auxiliary personnel for the Special Reserve, a semi-professional force whose members were liable in the advent of war for the call-up (Simkins, 2007: 13). It would also differ from previous official recruiting ventures. Prior to 1914, only posters, ‘usually very perfunctorily carried out’, appear to have been used to advertise the various regiments that made up the British Army (WO 106/364: 5 February 1914). Such campaigning was restricted to specific localities, but Seely and Le Bas envisioned something grander: a national advertising campaign for the entire Army.
On the face of it, Caxtons might seem an unusual company to lead this campaign. Founded at some point in the nineteenth century,​[3]​ it was not an advertising agency in the conventional sense of the word, specialising in the sale of encyclopaedias. Using newspapers to market its wares, Caxtons generated sales by eliciting responses to coupons attached to advertisements which offered customers free literature. This method of salesmanship, known as mail-order advertising, was a popular form of promotion in the early twentieth century (McFall, 2004: 146-7). Giving companies the names and addresses of potential customers, who were then visited in person by door-to-door salespersons, it allowed advertisers to ‘test’ reactions to advertisements by monitoring reader responses. In some circles, it was even regarded as a ‘scientific’ form of promotion (Hopkins, cited in McFall, 2004: 147), which might explain why the War Office invested £4,000 to it and other forms of publicity in 1914 (Field, 1959: 26), equivalent to more than £438,000 today.​[4]​ 
The lion’s share of that sum appears to have been devoted to newspapers. Regarded by some as a ‘conduit’ connecting rulers to ruled, newspapers reached audiences of millions in the early twentieth century, with the Daily Mail almost breaking the million mark in 1900 and the News of the World selling more than four million copies on Sundays by 1910 (Temple, 2008: 21, 26; Conboy, 2002: 101; Bingham and Conboy, 2015: 8). Like commercial advertisers, recruiters took a keen interest in newspapers precisely because they were read by so many people, and there were two main ways in which they could generate publicity for enlistment.
The first was through paid announcements – advertising. To manage this, Le Bas tasked Field with the development of copy while consulting Thomas Russell, a former advertising manager at the Times, for advice on a 32-page booklet that would accompany the advertisements. Targeting both national and provincial titles, these appeals would emphasise the material benefits of Army service. The first, a full-page spread on the front cover of the Daily Mail and the sixth page of the Daily Mirror, appeared on 15 January 1914. Presented as a newspaper article, it listed a series of ‘advantages’ to military service in an advertorial style. Entitled ‘What the Army Offers’, among the benefits it listed were generous holiday allowances, travel, ‘good wages, good food, and unique opportunities for Sports and Games’. War and conflict were conspicuous by their absence in both it and the abridged version of the advertisement that appeared in the provincial press a month later, in a range of titles catering to many large industrial towns, including the Birmingham Daily Mail, Dublin Evening Telegraph and Edinburgh Evening News (16 February 1914).​[5]​ 
Material rewards had been used in recruitment posters since Napoleonic times, when ‘aristocrats with a desire to lead their own divisions into battle…[used] private funds…to underwrite military advertising’ (Messenger, 1992: 215). What distinguished the Caxtons campaign from its predecessors was the scale of the promotional work undertaken on behalf of the Army, the fact that it was bankrolled by the state and not a private individual or institution, and the affinity such promotion shared to existing methods of commercial salesmanship. Caxtons, in a word, ‘sold’ recruitment to civilians in precisely the same manner as it had sold books to readers. The advertisements it produced offered prospective recruits a chance to send off for a free illustrated book entitled ‘The Army and What it Offers’, and with both the names and addresses of interested individuals the War Office dispatched recruiting sergeants just as Caxtons had sent door-to-door salespersons to market its books. 
The second means of promoting recruitment was through public relations, or what Field (1959: 27) called ‘editorial matter’: contacting journalists with suggestions for stories, issuing press releases to stoke their interest, or offering them pre-written articles that portrayed the military in a positive light. In the UK, most scholars have traced the emergence of public relations to the interwar era (for example, Anthony, 2012: ch 1; L’Etang, 2013: ch. 2), but Field’s testimony suggests an earlier lineage. Yet, it is hard to authenticate given the surreptitious way in which PR made its way into news. Articles authored at the behest of a third party were usually anonymised or attributed to journalists rather than their sources, and any story that did portray the military in a favourable light could well have been written without official interference.
What can be deduced from newspaper coverage of the period is that the campaign was generally well received. A correspondent for the Pall Mall Gazette, a major London title, described ‘recruiting by advertisement’ as an ‘up-to-date method’ that ‘does more in the way of tempting and explaining than the recruiting sergeant could ever hope to’ (15 January 1914). Another metropolitan title serving North Shields went a step further, issuing its own appeal to readers that preceded a verbatim reiteration of the Caxtons advertisement in the same column: 
We would call the attention of all able-bodied young men who may not be regularly employed or who may be in employment which gives what may be termed inadequate pay for their work to the advertisement in another [sic] column’ (Shields Daily News, 16 February 1914).
The War Office also sanctioned a major feature film, another ‘up-to-date’ recruiting method that also involved a degree of public-private collaboration. Produced by Keith, Prowse & Co. and Gaumont, production of The British Army Film (1914) began in May 1913 and finished before the end of the year. Launched at a private screening in the Palace Theatre in London in January 1914, four days after the first newspaper advertisements appeared, the film followed the life of a fictional new recruit in a quasi-documentary fashion, opening with a scene of the protagonist being directed to a recruiting depot by a sergeant and concluding with a battle that featured artillery support, Maxim guns and a bayonet charge (Hiley, 1985).
Given a full theatrical release seven months before the start of the war, The British Army Film was screened throughout the country and garnered a great deal of positive commentary in the national and provincial press. The Folkestone, Hythe, Sandgate and Cheriton Herald, for example, claimed the film showed the ‘soldier as he really is’, providing a ‘popular and entertaining’ depiction of Army life that was ‘absolutely unique’ in its realism (7 March 1914). Other dailies, such as the Belfast News-Letter (27 February 1914), Western Morning News (20 March 1914) and Aberdeen Evening Express (23 April 1914), were similarly effusive in their praise, with many using the same stock phrases in their reviews, suggesting Caxtons might have succeeded in generating ‘editorial matter’ for the War Office.
Perhaps the most important question to ask when reflecting on the pre-war campaign for soldiers is whether recruiters were actually successful in boosting enlistment. Speaking shortly after the campaign ended, Seely informed parliament that there had been a ‘most gratifying increase in the number of recruits obtained both for the Regular Army and for the Special Reserve week by week since we adopted this plan’ (Hansard, 24 March 1914: 228). According to Field (1959: 27), 50,000 men requested booklets in response to the newspaper advertisements he and Le Bas had designed. War Office records, however, paint a different picture, indicating that while the outbreak of hostilities in August 1914 led to a sudden increase in enlistment, similar numbers of men enrolled in the twelve months preceding that date as had joined up in the previous year (WO 106/364: undated).
Here it is worth offering a caveat. To assess recruitment campaigns entirely in terms of enrolment rates risks falling for the post hoc ergo propter hoc logical fallacy: for the idea, in other words, that because something occurs after a given event, it must have been caused by that event in the first place. In the sphere of military recruiting, there were many factors that shaped prospective recruit’s career choices, with official exhortations representing only one of them. We know from soldiers’ diaries that men enlisted in 1914 for a variety of reasons. Some were keen on the idea of military service and the sense of adventure it gave. Others were attracted to the uniform and the social status that accompanied soldiering. Another contingent still joined up because of pre-existing family connections to a specific corps or regiment (Holmes: 2005: chs. 5 and 7; Simkins, 2007: ch. 6). We also know from pre-war service records that a great number of men joined up because they had no other choice: unemployment, a lack of formal educational qualifications or a recognised trade effectively compelled these men to enlist (Holmes, 2005: 108).
In this context, it makes little sense to evaluate recruitment campaigns without considering the broader social, economic and political environment that gave rise to them. Those tasked with raising troops, however, often did just that, drawing direct, causal correlations between promotion and enrolment as if one thing simply caused the other. Their thinking reflected received ideas about the power of mass media to shape and mould public opinion in the early twentieth century, and the tendency for many observers to conflate propaganda with public opinion (Chapman, 2000: 680). Such ideas cast a long shadow over political discourse in the years that followed the 1913-14 campaign (Gullace, 2011), and became the principal raison d'être for all subsequent official recruitment campaigns. One could not, after all, devote large sums of money to advertising and public relations without placing at least some faith in the power of the mass media to change people’s minds. As Seely told parliament in March 1914, months before Britain entered the First World War and reputedly set up its propaganda machinery on the hoof, military recruitment campaigns served a straightforward function: to precipitate a ‘complete change in the attitude of the great mass of the people towards the Army’ (Hansard, 24 March 1914: 229).
‘Self-preservation as a Country’: Tri-Service Recruitment in 1946-50
When the War Office campaigned for recruits in 1913-14, neither it nor the Admiralty possessed internal machinery for organising advertising or public relations campaigns. By 1919, however, all three Service departments, including the new Air Ministry, had established a dedicated press bureau (Ogilvy-Webb, 1965: 51; Grant, 1994: 27). Tasked with handling relations with journalists, these bureaux were given overarching control over recruitment, though typically worked with commercial advertising agencies on major recruitment campaigns. In practice, this meant that PR became an in-house activity with advertising outsourced, at least in the two decades that followed the Great War. However, press bureaux were typically staffed with ex-journalists and were themselves reflections of the increasing encroachment of private expertise in the sphere of official communications. For much of the 1930s, for example, the War Office hired a retired journalist to handle its public relations while subcontracting its advertising to two agencies (WO 32/4587: 3 August 1937). 
There was a certain synergy to this arrangement. The Service departments utilised paid promotion as and when their needs required it, while they used public relations for the long-term work of cultivating positive relations with the press and the public. This arrangement suited the relatively modest mobilisation work that occurred between the wars, and may well have been used to raise the personnel required to contest the Second World War had the introduction of conscription in 1938 not rendered voluntary recruitment redundant for the duration of that conflict. 
It was not until 1946 that the Services resumed voluntary campaigning, with the Secretary of State for War Jack Lawson announcing a new tri-Service recruiting drive in May in an appeal broadcast on BBC radio. In his appeal, Lawson was careful to emphasise what he called the ‘danger of confused thinking’ on regular recruitment at a time when all British men of a certain age were liable to the call-up (PREM 8/281: 16 May 1946). 225,000 volunteers were required for the Army, Navy and Air Force, and a Services Publicity Committee was established to enrol them within a year. Sanctioning a major programme of paid advertising in the national daily and weekly newspapers, this committee produced a range of colour posters and lobbied Fleet Street to include favourable coverage of recruitment in the press as well (INF 12/316: 30 August 1946). The voluntary intake for 1946-7 was nevertheless a disappointing 180,000, and efforts were redoubled (Hansard: 11 August 1947: 2229).
While both post-war campaigns explored in this paper occurred during a period of conscription, they were also organised at time when ‘larger organisational units’ came to dominate government propaganda in Britain (Anthony, 2012: 164). The most visible manifestation of such a ‘unit’ was the Central Office of Information (COI), a powerful non-ministerial department that continued much of the work of the wartime Ministry of Information after 1945 (Tulloch, 1993; Moore, 2006; Grant, 1999; Maartens, 2016b). Another important institution was the MOD, an umbrella organisation formed in 1947 which provided the administrative machinery necessary to organise recruitment campaigns for all three Services at the same time.
The MOD and COI allowed for a greater degree of centralised control over military recruitment, with the COI in particular altering the ways in which paid promotion was planned and produced. Providing departmental press bureaux with a single, official advertising agency,​[6]​ it offered a range of services to government departments, such as filmmaking, public opinion polling and exhibition management. The Services made extensive use of it, but they were not its only ‘clients’. In the first years of peace, a major export drive and new departments like the National Health Service consumed the lion’s share of the state’s promotional resources (Wildy, 1986; Crofts, 1986). A measure of the importance attached to military recruiting can be gleaned from official figures indicating that the MOD was allocated a mere 10% of government newspaper advertising space in the first half of 1948, less than half the amount given to a single fortnightly economic bulletin (CAB 134/357: 28 May 1948). 
The armed forces, furthermore, were not the only recruiters. Using the same techniques as the military, and often relying on a similar cache of commercial expertise, several nationalised industries organised their own recruitment campaigns for civilian employees after the war. As one MP put it in a parliamentary debate on conscription in 1947: ‘there is not one recruiting campaign in this country but half a dozen campaigns going on – recruiting for miners, recruiting for the iron foundries, and [for] half a dozen other industries [as well]’ (Hansard, 31 March 1947: 1763).
This created an obvious problem for the Service ministries, which found themselves in direct competition with other government departments for the employees they needed to fill various regular, reserve and auxiliary positions. The pendulum nevertheless began to swing back in their favour in the second half of 1948, after a coup in Czechoslovakia and the attempted Soviet blockade of Berlin effectively kick-started the Cold War. A new system of civil defence was created as part of ‘crash plans’ for another conflict (CAB 130/41: 1 October 1948), and Britain forged new military and political alliances with northern Europe and North America through bodies like the Western Union and North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. Increasing militarisation of the domestic and international spheres was matched by a corollary growth in ‘defence’ expenditure, which began to creep up in 1949 and reached a historically high peacetime level of 10% of GDP in 1950, the year Britain committed troops to Korea (Hansard, 12 April 1949: 2743; Lloyd, 2002: 273). 
These events had a knock-on effect on recruitment advertising. In 1946 and 1947, advertisements for regular enlistment in the tri-Service accentuated pay, promotion prospects and travel opportunities. The Navy, the least active recruiter during this period, released an appeal that described service as a ‘life of travel and adventure, with good food, pay and prospects’ (Burnley Express, 13 August 1947). In an illustrated advertisement targeting recently demobilised veterans, the Army emphasised both the possibilities for ‘quick promotion’ for returning soldiers and the financial rewards, in the form of a tax-free bounty of £100-125, that such men would get if they signed up (Derby Daily Telegraph, 20 December 1946). The RAF, for its part, repeatedly conflated military service with civilian employment, encouraging readers to ‘Join the Regular Air Force for a Regular Job’ in one advertisement and describing deployments as a ‘home from home’ in another (Bedfordshire Times and Independent, 14 February 1947; Dundee Evening Telegraph, 7 May 1947).
Appeals to monetary gains, camaraderie and adventure did not cease after the start of the Cold War. However, recruiters began to incorporate more exhortations that directly or indirectly alluded to the prospect of war. In early 1948, the War Office, for example, planned to use the slogan ‘Spare time for Britain’ for a Territorial Army campaign. That phrase was promptly discarded after events in Europe, with one official claiming that the change in ‘international affairs has created an entirely new situation…[and] a completely new atmosphere… In these fresh circumstances, such a slogan as “Spare Time for Britain” is not pungent or provocative enough’. A new campaign theme was quickly drawn up which combined appeals to ‘comradeship, extra money and rations’ with the notion that enlistment would ensure ‘self-preservation as a country’ (INF 12/316: 21 October 1948).​[7]​ 
This theme extended to other forms of promotion produced by other forces. Throughout 1949, all three Services organised public exhibitions in an attempt to increase the profile and prestige of the military. The RAF affixed a ‘tableau display’ onto six travelling vehicles which toured the UK (Motherwell Times, 4 February 1949). The Navy dispatched a flotilla described in one newspaper as a ‘“round-Britain” recruiting cruise…[comprised] of four motor torpedo-boats from H. M. S. Hornet’ (Aberdeen and Press Journal, 10 August 1949). The Army hosted several regimental rallies, including one in Berwick for the Royal Northumberland Fusiliers which represented, according to a report in a local newspaper, the ‘more glamorous and ceremonial side of Army life’ (Berwick Advertiser, 28 April 1949).
Mixing pageantry with ostentatious displays of military prowess, such exhibitions tapped into a tradition of military spectacle that dates back to the nineteenth century (Myerly, 1992). They were combined with a major newspaper advertising campaign. In August 1948, the War Office was granted an ‘increase of some four to nine per cent of…newspaper advertising space’, devoting it to the Territorials. Within a matter of weeks, the Navy and RAF were granted additional space to promote their auxiliary forces (INF 12/316: undated). Reservists could be called up in wartime, and were recruited alongside entrants to civil defence services. Priority was initially given to the fighting forces, but in two years expenditure on civil defence reached parity with the military within the domain of newspaper advertising. By March 1950, civil defence was allocated just shy of 10% of total government newspaper advertising space, with the Service departments sharing a combined total of 28% between them (CAB 130/41: 1 October 1948; CAB 130/41: undated).
Increases in expenditure were not just witnessed in newspapers. In 1950, overall spending on defence promotion rose to £921,000, representing a quarter of domestic government spending on ‘information’ and just over £30 million in today’s money (CAB 134/359: 18 March 1950, 17 June 1950). The large sums expended and the fact they were devoted to both fighting and civil defence forces introduced a new degree of complexity to campaigning. It also created a political crisis for the Attlee administration. Rearmament necessitated the diversion of public money from domestic social programmes and was a politically contentious policy. In 1950, a Defence Publicity Committee was established to counteract public criticism of this policy, boost recruitment of regular and auxiliary personnel, and provide a ‘continuous flow of information and explanation…to establish understanding and goodwill between the Forces and the general public which they serve’. Such objectives were ‘inseparably linked’, according to one COI official (CAB 134/359: 17 June 1950), and demonstrated the extent to which the post-war recruitment drive had metamorphosed into a campaign for hearts and minds waged on British soil. 
This campaign involved an eclectic array of exhortations and spectacles. According to official files, recruiters ‘[a]ctive[ly liaised] with the national press, periodicals, B.B.C., newsreels, and photographic agencies’. Posters, newsreels and small-scale films were produced and distributed. Window displays for recruiting depots and local and national government buildings were created. A number of military festivals and tattoos were also organised, and complemented with speeches delivered by politicians and lectures given by specialist COI staff. Loud-speaker announcements were made at football matches, and mobile ‘recruiting vans’ were sent across the country to supplement the aforementioned exhibitions (INF 12/316: 11 October 1948; CAB 134/359: 17 June 1950; WO 216/717: 9 November 1950). 
Some of this promotion played on fears of war, and nuclear war especially. One pamphlet produced by Everetts Advertising,​[8]​ for example, encouraged readers to join the civil defence to protect the ‘millions of survivors’ of a ‘H-Bomb’ attack (HO 303/3: 1950). Material rewards nevertheless remained a cornerstone of the campaign, with recruiters from all three Services enticing civilians with promises of ‘good pay and allowances’ (Portsmouth Evening News, 19 June 1950), ‘good food, pay and prospects’ (Aberdeen Press and Journal, 16 March 1949) and ‘unrivalled opportunities’ (Hull Daily Mail, 28 May 1949). In these exhortations a balance was struck between appeals to civic duty and personal gain, but this was not always convincing. In one RAF advertisement, prospective recruits were literally asked, not told, ‘The Royal Air Force Wants You?’ (Hull Daily Mail, 25 February 1949), a question whose rhetorical character symbolised the ambiguity of the campaign.
According to official records, this strategy did not bear fruit. While the War Office reported ‘reasonably successful’ returns for the Territorial Army in 1948-9, its regular recruiting remained poor and similar outcomes were reported by the Admiralty and Air Ministry (CAB 134/359: 17 June 1950). When war in Asia began, furthermore, it did not, unlike in 1914, appear to have a material effect on mobilisation. ‘Recruiting figures’, wrote one official, ‘show that the outbreak of hostilities in Korea…and the mounting international tension during the summer, had little positive effect on regular recruitment’. The Army and Navy figures for July, weeks after Britain joined the war, were down when ‘compared with the preceding month’, and enrolment rates on a longer timeframe indicated a slow but steady decline in voluntary recruitment across all three Services from 1946 until 1950. The Army and RAF, for instance, enrolled over 8,000 recruits apiece in December 1946, but that number had dropped to less than 4,000 by June 1950 (INF 12/321: 29 September 1950). Civil defence fared just as badly, with the ‘number of recruits required…far exceed[ing] those already obtained’ (CAB 134/359: 17 June 1950).
Such disappointing returns did not trigger the end of voluntary campaigning, and recruiters continued to exhort and cajole the public well into the Korean War. Unlike their predecessors in 1913-14, however, those tasked with mobilisation in 1946-50 appeared to grasp the significance of social context to recruitment outcomes. As one official said a fortnight before the beginning of that war:
The public’s estimation of the sailor, soldier and airman the Services’ own idea of what the public knows and thinks about them, the serving man’s conceit of [sic] himself and the job he is doing for his country[:] these things influence the barometer of recruitment just as much as the potential recruit’s picture of the material conditions he will find inside the service in which he is interested. Without such a climate of general opinion, reasonably well informed and sympathetic, no recruiting campaign can succeed. (CAB 134/359: 17 June 1950)
The challenge, of course, was developing such a ‘climate’ in the first place.
‘The Future is with the R.A.F.’: Modernising the RAF, 1960-3
The final campaign explored in this paper owes its origins to a decision, announced in a defence White Paper in 1957, to phase out National Service. Britain’s disastrous foray in Egypt the year beforehand prompted a review of defence policy which led to a major reduction in the manned strength of the armed forces, a renewed emphasis on an independent nuclear deterrent, and an end to compulsory military service (Navias, 1989; Grant, 2008; Vasquez, 2011; French, 2012: chs. 7-8). While these reforms reduced the size of the armed forces, however, they also increased pressure on the government to boost voluntary recruitment to make up for a projected shortfall in conscripts. The sense of alarm this created within the military establishment was palpable, with one retired officer warning that ‘unless a miracle happens, we shall not get the Regulars we need’ (PREM 11/2088: 26 June 1957).
To try to bring about such a ‘miracle’, all three Services prepared major recruitment campaigns for the late 1950s and early 1960s. Like the 1946-50 drive, these campaigns involved a mixture of advertising and public relations developed by the COI and departmental press bureaux (Maartens, 2018). However, unlike these antecedents they were predicated on an attempt to discover what attracted civilians to the armed forces in the first place. In 1956, the MOD commissioned a study from Social Survey, an official opinion polling agency based within the COI, to ‘obtain information which would provide some immediate guidance in the planning of recruitment publicity’. Finding that each Service possessed its own unique attractions to prospective recruits, H. D. Wilcox, the survey’s author, claimed that the:
attitude of young men towards recruiting publicity tends to be rather diffusely sceptical. Few think it paints a true picture of what things are like. Most criticise it for omitting some unpleasant aspect of Service life or exaggerating some pleasant or advantageous aspect (RG 23/250: September 1956).
The claims recruiters made, in other words, were often taken with a large pinch of salt, and this made the task of recruiters particularly challenging.
Wilcox’s report also touched on other important issues facing recruiters in the mid-twentieth century. A nascent youth culture (Street, 1994; Marwick, 1998; Osgerby, 2005) and rising affluence (Schenk, 1994; Jefferys, 2007; Whiting, 2008) created new challenges for the armed forces in the 1950s and 1960s. In earlier times, the Services had relied on a steady stream of unemployed men to swell the ranks, but full employment reduced the number of available applicants in the post-war era, intensifying competition for recruits between the military and industry.
To address these challenges, the Macmillan government authorised pay increases for all three Services in 1958. Credited with major increases in voluntary enlistment in the Army and Air Force (Hansard, 24 November 1958: 54), the benefits apparently accrued from this strategy were nevertheless short-lived. By 1960, the flow of regulars had subsided, prompting the MOD to invite Sir Frederic Hooper, a corporate management expert, to explore ways of improving the forces’ recruitment.
On the face of it, Hooper was a somewhat unusual appointment. Managing Director of the Schweppes beverage company, he had an extensive commercial background but no first-hand military experience. He also espoused a philosophy of progressive management that seemed to sit at odds with the hierarchical imperatives of the Services. Hired to advise all three Services, Hooper produced two reports in July 1960 which crystallised his recommendations. The first report concerned the Army, a Service which bore the ‘stigma of providing a career only for those unable to find fruitful employment in civilian life’ (DEFE 7/1244: 7 July 1960; 20 July 1960). The second concerned the Navy and RAF, whose recruiters Hooper roundly praised. 
I was particularly impressed… They do not regard their work as a “sales job”, but as an exercise in public relations. They have grasped that if they present the facts about the Royal Air Force and the advantages of a Service career over civilian employment, they will get the right candidates who would stay with them. Any suggestion of pulling the wool over the eyes of prospective recruits was carefully avoided. (DEFE 7/1245: 28 July 1960) 
While Hooper’s assessment of the RAF’s recruiting sergeants was positive, he said very little about the media appeals developed by the Air Ministry at the time. The RAF, for its part, appears to have drawn inspiration for its 1960-63 campaign from Hooper’s emphasis on ‘modernity’ in his initial report on the Army:
In the minds of the young, modernity will always be a criterion for excellence. One of our tasks, therefore, is to examine life in the Army in order to discover where it can be brought more up to date… [The Army] way of life must be based on the changing manners and customs of the country. (Ibid)
Modernity is a slippery concept, but for Hooper it simply meant a willingness to pay greater attention to the lives and well-being of employees. Such principles were underscored in RAF advertising, with the slogan ‘The Future is with the R.A.F.’ appearing on all advertisements in 1960-3 and the phrase ‘way of life’​[9]​ featuring in a newspaper advertisement which promised new recruits ‘[m]ore than a job…more than a career…[but] a satisfying, rewarding way of life’ (INF 2/176: undated A). 
One of scores of advertisements released in periodicals and national and provincial newspapers, this advertisement formed part of a long-running campaign funded by the Air Ministry but produced by the commercial agency Clifford Bloxham and Partners. A major player in the post-war British advertising scene, Clifford Bloxham specialised in print media and handled the development of copy and art. While the War Office began to experiment with television advertising, Clifford Bloxham convinced the Air Ministry to prioritise what the agency called the ‘proved and established media’ of newspapers, magazines and pamphlets (INF 12/927: 2 November 1961). Fending off competition from other firms for the recruiting contract, it established a relationship with the RAF that continued into the 1970s (INF 2/191).
Bespoke appeals for the different roles the Air Ministry advertised represented a key feature of the 1960-3 campaign. Applicants for cadet, vocational and academic programmes were enticed with cartoon-like illustrations of military training which presented service as an adventure comparable to the stories found in comic books. Older candidates for technical ground and air crew positions, in contrast, were exhorted with colourful photographs of the military hardware that they could work on. Applicants for the Women’s Royal Air Force, technically a separate service to the RAF until the two merged in 1994, were lured with ‘modern job[s] for a modern woman’ (INF 2/175; INF 12/927; Coventry Evening Telegraph, 22 March 1962). 
Employability and transferable skills became key motifs of the campaign, but the type of employment offered and the nature of the skills nurtured varied from position to position. Candidates for Cranwell and Henlow, the Air Force’s main degree-awarding colleges, were lured with promises of future ‘leadership’, with one full-colour advertisement claiming students were ‘Air Marshals in the making’ (INF 2/176: September 1962). Individuals interested in Locking and Halton, on the other hand, were encouraged to enrol to learn ‘a trade that will stand you in good stead throughout your life’ (INF 2/176: undated B). Locking and Halton offered diplomas equivalent to A-levels, not degrees, and a transparent class hierarchy emerged in advertisements in this period, with individuals interested in non-commissioned positions lured with appeals to ‘[job] security for life’ while those who expressed a desire for commissioned service were promised the ‘best of both worlds’.
There is the world of the air: an adventurous life that can take you to any one of a dozen different countries – and give you the satisfaction of doing a vitally important and responsible job. Then there is the world of the off-duty officers: the companionship that only Service life can give, the traditional hospitality of the Officers Mess, generous leave and the chance to take part in any game or sport you can name. (INF 2/176: undated C)
Many advertisements used technology, and in particular the promise of being able to use it, as an appeal. The speed of jet fighters like the Lightning (‘a fighter that can exceed the speed of sound even in a climb’) and the manoeuvrability of helicopters like the Whirlwind (‘quick-change artists of the Royal Air Force’) were emphasised in a series of advertisements released in 1960-62 (INF 2/176: undated D and undated E). A separate collection of appeals targeted parents and school teachers, offering hypothetical answers to a series of rhetorical questions, as in: 
When your son is 15…will he get the apprenticeship he needs? You are a trained man with a good trade. What about your son?…This is the era of the specialist. The best jobs go to the men with technical qualifications and a sound training behind them… If a man has an R. A. F. apprenticeship behind him, he has a fine future ahead. (INF 2/176: undated F).
Unlike the other recruiting drives considered in this paper, records of the cost of this campaign do not appear to have been preserved. However, the Air Ministry did make a conscious effort to try to monitor its effects. As in 1913-14, coupons were attached to advertisements, with responses recorded in a large ‘cuttings book’ now stored in the National Archives (INF 2/176). The results of this investigation were inconclusive. Some advertisements that attracted a number of responses on certain days attracted no responses on others. The same advertisement could, moreover, attract varying degrees of public interest, both in multiple publications and within the same publication on different days. There was, in short, an arbitrariness to public enquiries that did not seem to indicate any substantive evidence of media effects.
More rigorous attempts to probe the impact of promotion were carried out by Social Survey, which produced two reports on RAF recruitment in 1957 and 1961. The first of these explored the ‘principal influences’ determining the ‘level of recruiting…to ground trades…apprentices and boy entrants and…air crew’. Finding no ‘measurable relationship’ between advertising expenditure and civilian applications for these positions, its author claimed that ‘level of civilian earnings compared with R.A.F. rates of pay’ played a greater role in regulating enrolments than promotion. The ‘material attractions of a service career’, in other words, carried more weight than advertising or public relations, with recruiters’ principal task being to ‘persuade the mass of the population that the services offer everything that any civil employment offers and something more besides’ (AIR 77/244: October 1957). The second, an analysis of recruiting brochures, found that the ‘booklets issued by the Air Ministry did not, on balance, influence enquirers’ (RG 23/284: January 1961).
These reports appeared to indicate that recruiters held little sway over public opinion. Yet, it was through their advertising and public relations that civilians came to learn about such things as the pay offered to new recruits. The promotion produced in 1960-63 repeatedly stressed the financial advantages of RAF careers, and in that sense reflected the idea that material rewards rather than a prevailing sense of patriotic duty should take priority in voluntary campaigning. This strategy may have had some success. In late 1963, the Secretary of State for Air Hugh Fraser told parliament that there were only ‘marginal shortages in some trades, mainly on the administrative side – for example, nursing attendant and supplier, as well as in the unskilled assistant grades’. Yet, Fraser also conceded that the ‘total number we have required in this year has been considerably lower than last year’ (Hansard: 9 December 1963: 118-9) – that the RAF, in other words, was shrinking – and did not reveal precisely how many civilians had joined up in that year.

Reflecting on the Legacy of Peacetime Military Recruitment 
Given their apparently negligible effect on enrolment, it is worth asking why successive British governments devoted substantial resources to large-scale military recruitment campaigns. One possible explanation, sometimes referred to as the politician’s fallacy, is the belief that it is better to do something than nothing at all. When faced with manpower shortages, Service ministers liked to be seen to be doing something to negate parliamentary or journalistic criticism, and recruiting drives of the kind explored here certainly represented emphatic statements of intent. Designed to generate public discussion of, and enthusiasm for, military service, they involved an eclectic range of mediated and interpersonal appeals which have received only passing attention in the literature on media, war and conflict.
Another explanation is a little less obvious but perhaps more suggestive. Many peacetime recruitment campaigns were organised at times of global political uncertainty, when the prospect of war loomed large on the current affairs agenda. This was certainly the case in the campaigns explored in this paper. Conflict followed hot on the heels of the 1913-14 and 1946-50 campaigns, and there were times in the early 1960s when a return to global hostilities seemed equally likely. Recruitment campaigns, at least in these three instances, were part of a pre-emptive strategy to shore up Britain’s armed forces. Those responsible for organising them, however, made few explicit references to active service in official promotion. On the contrary, they depicted military service as a rewarding but not fundamentally dangerous adventure – as a ‘regular job’, to quote one of the advertisements discussed above, not a career which carried a great deal of potential risk to those who partook in it.
Here it is worth drawing some parallels between Britain and other nations which organised large-scale military recruitment campaigns in the recent past. Writing in the late 1970s, the sociologist Charles Moskos (1977) suggested that the United States Army was in the process of transitioning from an ‘institution’ to an ‘occupation’. Institutions, Moskos claimed, were ‘legitimated in terms of values and norms, i.e., a purpose transcending individual self-interest in favour of a presumed higher good’. Occupations, in contrast, were ‘legitimated in terms of the marketplace, i.e., prevailing monetary rewards for equivalent competencies’ (Moskos, 1977: 42-3). The end of the draft in January 1973 and subsequent US withdrawal from Vietnam in March shifted the balance in favour of occupations, triggering an accompanying transformation in American recruitment advertising. As Beth Bailey has shown, appeals to patriotic duty, civic pride and other, seemingly high-minded ideals made way for exhortations that focused almost exclusively on individual self-fulfilment and promised new recruits ‘individuality, exotic travel and [even] sex’ (Bailey, 2009: 80).
Scholars writing about the recruiting practices of other national armed forces have identified similar tropes. The Israeli Defence Force, Yagil Levy (2010) has contended, increasingly resembles a ‘market’, not citizen, army, and the same might be said for Belgium (Manigart, 2005). What makes the UK case interesting is that such a ‘market’ found a voice in official promotion more than a century ago, and that it appears to have been ‘sold’ to civilian audiences with a similar range of appeals to those witnessed in the US decades later. This tells us something important about the nature of peacetime recruitment. While abstract concepts like duty, honour and integrity were often used to tempt men and women to the Services in wartime, peacetime recruiters turned to more tangible benefits like pay, travel and recreational opportunities. Their appeals reflected the kinds of inducements associated with commercial advertising, even if they were not technically ‘selling’ anything, and they pandered to individual gratification, not a presumed greater good.
This is perhaps the most salient point to bear in mind when reflecting on the legacy of peacetime recruiting, and it is a point that invites a coda. By defining service in terms of material rewards, recruiters effectively commodified it, painting a picture of military life that was, if not manifestly false, then certainly extremely misleading. As new arrivals quickly discovered, the armed forces were not bastions of ‘individuality’: they offered careers which, though undeniably exciting for some, were also deeply restrictive. Nor were they reservoirs of lucrative employment: while new recruits could get paid relatively well, they had to work extremely long hours, often away from their homes and loved ones, for the privilege. These facets of military life, like the drawbacks of a product or the small print of a contract, were conspicuous by their absence in official recruitment promotion which accentuated the positives while downplaying the negatives. More work could profitably be done to explore the impact such promotion had, not on enrolment rates, but on new recruits’ perceptions of military service. Though large numbers of civilians do not appear to have joined up in response to the campaigns explored in this paper, some individuals probably did, and it would useful to know whether they developed unrealistic expectations of military life as a result of the appeals they encountered. It would also be interesting to probe the broader impact such appeals had on public understandings of the armed forces. The young and fit were not, after all, the only individuals who encountered official promotion, and the responses of those who did not or could not enlist have yet to receive any serious scholarly scrutiny at all.











Notes



^1	 .  Post-war conscription was gradually phased out from 1957, with December 1962 earmarked as the month in which the last national servicemen would be demobilised. Conscripts served for a minimum of two years, and conscription itself ceased in 1960. However, it was not until May 1963 that the last national servicemen, Richard Vaughan, left the Army, having extended his service for an additional six months.
^2	 .  Chief among these being the 1902 Education of Officers Report, the 1904 Esher Report and the 1904 Royal Commission on the Boer War (Travers, 1982: 524).
^3	 .  Hiley (1987: 31) dates the emergence of the Caxtons Publishing Company to 1899, but records of Companies House indicate that a company bearing the same name was incorporated at some point in 1865 (BT 31/1054/1850C).
^4	 .  All historical price comparisons have been based on the Bank of England’s inflation calculator at: https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/monetary-policy/inflation
^5	 .  All newspaper references have been sourced from the British Newspaper Archive and Irish Newspaper Archive, whose records can be accessed online via: https://www.britishnewspaperarchive.co.uk/ and https://www.irishnewsarchive.com/.
^6	 .  While the COI produced reams of paid promotion, it also invited commercial firms to bid for official contracts in what amounted to an early example of outsourcing.
^7	 .  While the slogan was abandoned, a film entitled Any Time to Spare (1948) was not. I have found little information on this film apart from a solitary reference to screenings in ‘all cinemas of the Rank organisation’ (INF 12/316: 11 October 1948). 
^8	 .  This agency was a founding member of the Advertising Service Guild. One of its Associate Directors, Brian Smith, was also instrumental in the establishment of the History of Advertising Trust and later chaired the body (Fletcher, 2008: 117-118).
^9	 .  Though probably coincidental, Raymond Williams famously associated the same phrase with cultural studies at around the same time (Williams, 1958).BibliographyAnthony, S. (2012) Public Relations and the Making of Modern Britain. Cambridge: Cambridge UP.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